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Abstract
Recently, some industries have collectively agreed not to produce models that
do not meet an energy efficiency (and hence an environmental) standard. This
paper presents a simple model that can be used to examine a voluntary collective
agreement to limit or completely eliminate the low efficiency model of a given
product (e.g., a low efficiency washing machine). We show that, when there is
competition between firms, a collective agreement to limit or even eliminate pro-
duction of the polluting model can actually increase profits for all firms in the
industry. This suggests that a collective agreement of this type might actually
be beneficial to firms, while at the same time improving environmental quality.
However, the implicit enforcement that comes from the public nature of the com-
mitment is necessary to ensure this outcome. This suggests that, by promoting
such agreements, policymakers may be able to achieve substantial environmental
gains with relatively little inducement. The impact on social welfare will then de-
pend on whether these gains are sufficiently large to offset consumer losses from
reductions in product variety and the associated price increases.
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I.  Introduction 
 There is a growing interest in the use of voluntary approaches (VAs) as an 
alternative to more traditional approaches to environmental protection, such as regulation 
or taxation.  This interest has spurred a number of theoretical and empirical studies of 
VAs.1  This literature addresses a number of different possible impacts of VAs, including 
impacts on environmental performance, firm profitability, and market structure.  Most of 
this literature has focused on VAs that seek to reduce the pollution generated by firms in 
their production processes, and the motivation to do so that can stem from, for example, 
consumer demand (i.e., “green” preferences) or regulatory threats. 
 In some cases, however, the environmental impact of a firm’s activities comes not 
from its production but rather from the consumption of its products.  An example is 
products whose use entails the consumption of large amounts of energy (e.g., appliances 
such as washing machines, refrigerators, computers or lighting) or large amounts of 
water.  Such products are particularly important in the context of greenhouse gas 
emissions and global warming and water scarcity in areas such as the western U.S. 
 When voluntary impacts stem from a product’s consumption rather than its 
production, a voluntary approach might take the form of some firms within an industry 
choosing voluntarily to produce a more energy or water efficient product.  A subset of 
firms within the industry may seek to do so in an effort to differentiate their product and 
appeal to green consumers.  Alternatively, a voluntary approach could take the form of a 
firm or group of firms (possibly even an entire industry) agreeing to reduce or eliminate 
production of products that are not efficient.  If they agree to produce only efficient 
products, all firms produce an identical product and hence there is no product 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Segerson and Li (1999), Khanna (2001), Lyon and Maxwell (2001), and Alberini and 
Segerson (2002) for recent surveys of the literature on voluntary approaches to environmental protection. 
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differentiation.  An example of this is the European voluntary agreement on washing 
machines. In April 1996 the principal European producers and importers of clothes 
washing machines (comprising 95% of the EC market) presented a commitment to stop 
producing for and importing into the European Union washing machines that have low 
energy efficiency and hence high associated emissions, and to reduce the average energy 
consumption of washing machines by 20% (CECED, 1997; CECED, 2000).  This 
agreement was aimed at eliminating from the market products that do not meet certain 
environmental criteria. By the end of the initial washing machines agreement, the 
percentage of high efficiency machines (class A and B) had increased from 38% in 1996 
to around 80% in 2002 (CECED, 2002).  The successful fulfillment of the first 
commitment motivated the industry to present a second commitment for the period 2002-
2008 (CECED, 2003; CECED, 2004).  Similar agreements have also been made for 
household dishwashers, water heaters, household refrigerators, freezers, televisions and 
radios (International Energy Agency, 2005).  
 A key feature of the above agreements is that firms collectively agreed not to 
produce the low efficiency (polluting) product.  In contrast, in the standard literature on 
voluntary abatement, firms are typically assumed to make individual or unilateral 
decisions about polluting processes or products.2   For example, a firm could voluntarily 
decide to produce a “green” rather than a “brown” product in an effort to differentiate its 
product and appeal to green consumers (e.g., Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995).  Given 
this, the question is what, if anything, is to be gained by a collective agreement?     
In this paper we examine voluntary initiatives that take the form of reducing or 
eliminating production of polluting products.  Our main goal is to seek to explain why 
                                                 
2 See the references in the surveys cited in footnote 1. 
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collective agreements of this type might emerge.  Toward this end, we consider three 
questions:3  (a) Do firms have an incentive to reduce or eliminate production of polluting 
products unilaterally, i.e., without a commitment by other firms to do the same, in an 
attempt, for example, to differentiate their product?  (b) Do firms have an incentive to 
enter into a collective agreement that commits all firms in the market to reduce or 
eliminate production of the product? and (c) If firms enter into a collective agreement, do 
they have an incentive to adhere to it, i.e., is such an agreement self-enforcing?   
Our main result is that, while in the context of our model firms do not have an 
incentive to limit production unilaterally, under some conditions a collective agreement 
to reduce or eliminate production can actually increase profits for all firms.  In addition, 
we show that a profitable agreement always exists. Thus, there is always the potential for 
firms to enter into an agreement to limit the production of the polluting model that 
simultaneously raises profits and improves environmental quality.  However, regardless 
of whether an agreement is profitable, collective agreements are not self-enforcing, i.e., 
each firm has an incentive to cheat on the agreement.  Thus, some enforcement 
mechanism is needed to ensure that an agreement does not fall apart.  We suggest that 
having the voluntary agreement sufficiently public (rather than simply an internal 
agreement among firms), coupled with the ability to detect cheating easily, can provide 
enforcement.   
Our results have potentially important policy implications.  Most previous 
analyses of VAs assume that the voluntary actions undertaken by firms are costly and 
                                                 
3 Because we are interested in providing an explanation for the emergence of these agreements, we focus 
here on the impact they have on firms.  Alternatively, we could focus on either their environmental or 
welfare effects.  In fact, the potential environmental benefits led the European Commission to grant anti-
trust exemptions for the washing machine, dishwasher, and water heater agreements, despite concerns 
about the implications for competition (Martinez-Lopez, 2000, 2002).   
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hence reduce producer profits.  In the dishwasher and water heater agreements noted 
above, it was clearly recognized that the agreement would restrict each manufacturer’s 
freedom to produce and market its products (Martinez-Lopez, 2002).  For this reason, it is 
often believed that some external pressure, such as a regulatory threat, is necessary to 
induce firms to undertake those actions.4  In fact, Paton (2005) states that participation in 
the Clothes Washer Energy Star Program was influenced by the threat of regulation.  
Without any formal analysis, he also claims that such agreements prevent non-
participating firms from undercutting the prices of participating firms.  Similarly, the 
manufacturers of washing machines realize that, in order to achieve the energy savings 
target they set without harming the competitiveness of participants, it is important that as 
many firms as possible join the agreement (CECED, 2002).  Our analysis provides some 
support for this claim.  It suggests that the assumption that voluntary agreements are 
costly to firms and that some form of government inducement (e.g., cost sharing or 
threat) is necessary to induce participation is not always correct.   Rather, firms might be 
motivated to enter a public voluntary agreement of this type by the prospect that it would 
be an enforcement mechanism designed to solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma problem faced by 
the firms.5  This suggests that by facilitating such agreements, the government can 
improve environmental quality in a way that could actually be profitable for firms. 
Our analysis is based on a simple model of a market in which there are two 
possible versions (models) of a particular product, a high polluting (low efficiency) 
                                                 
4 Examples of theoretical studies that consider the role of external pressures are Segerson and Miceli 
(1998), Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000), and Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell (2000).  Empirical evidence 
regarding these pressures is presented in Khanna and Anton (2002). 
 
5 The inability of firms to develop an enforcement mechanism that overcomes the Prisoner’s Dilemma can 
discourage firms from participating in VA’s.  This can be true under strict antitrust regulation.  Kappas 
(1997) states that antitrust liabilities associated with voluntary initiatives in the US have often discouraged 
industry self-regulation.  That may explain why the U.S. clothes washer market is characterized by 
government regulation rather than an industry-wide VA of the type that emerged in the European market.  
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model and a low polluting (high efficiency) model.6  While our approach is motivated by 
the examples of energy-efficient appliances given above (and the discussion in the text 
reflects this), the analysis is relevant to other context as well (e.g., water use).7   We 
develop a model that is similar to the product line models in De Fraja (1996) and Johnson 
and Myatt (2003).8   In contrast to most of the literature on product quality,9 these models 
assume that identical competing firms simultaneously choose quality and quantity and 
quality is modeled as a discrete rather than continuous choice.  They predict equilibria in 
which firms can produce identical product lines (rather than specializing in a single 
quality).  Simultaneous choice is more relevant when firms cannot easily change the 
product specification (De Fraja, 1996).  We adopt this approach because it is consistent 
with the observation that for many products an individual firm will produce models of 
varying levels of efficiency.10   We use the model to examine the impacts of voluntary 
initiatives to reduce or eliminate production of the low efficiency model.11   
                                                 
6 Using the washing machine example for concreteness, we can think of the low efficiency model as the top 
loading machine and the high efficiency model as the front loading machine.  According to Consumer 
Reports energy efficiency ratings, front loading machines score an average of 1.5 while the top loading 
machines score an average of 3.2 on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being most efficient (Consumer Reports, 
2006). 
 
7 An interesting example of products with varying levels of energy efficiency is automobiles.  The model in 
this paper does not directly apply to automobiles, since it implies that the more energy efficient models will 
sell for a higher price.  This is clearly not the case for automobiles, primarily because automobile models 
with lower fuel economy have other compensating qualities (e.g., comfort, safety) that also affect price.  
We examine the case of automobiles in a related paper (Ahmed and Segerson, 2006). 
 
8 Earlier examples of models with product lines include Gal-Or (1983), Brander and Eaton (1984), and 
Champsaur and Rochet (1989). 
 
9 The literature on quality choice typically assumes a two-stage game in which competing firms choose 
quality in the first stage and prices (or output levels) in the second stage.  It is usually either assumed that 
each firm produces a single quality or such a result is predicted in equilibrium.  Examples of this literature 
include Shaked and Sutton (1982), Motta (1993), Wauthy (1996), Lehmann-Grube (1997), Valetti (2000), 
and Wang and Yang (2001).   
 
10  See Chen (2001) for a discussion of various examples of  “green” and “traditional” product lines. 
 
11 Our analysis is also related to the literature on minimum quality standards, e.g., Ronnen (1991), 
Crampes and Hollander (1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997), Maxwell (1998), Scarpa (1998), Lutz, et al. 
(2000), and Valletti (2000).  However, this literature also typically assumes that each firm produces a single 
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents the basic structure of our 
model.  For simplicity we derive most of the results in the case where there are two 
possible versions of a product, the high and the low efficiency versions.  In Section III, 
we consider first the simplest case in which the market is a monopoly and compare the 
equilibrium where the monopolist is free to produce both models to the equilibrium 
where it agrees to produce only the high efficiency model.  The results here are fairly 
standard, but they allow us to establish a benchmark regarding the impact of eliminating 
the competition between the two models.  We then examine in Section IV the more 
interesting case of a duopoly, in which there is the potential for competition not only 
between the two models as in the monopoly case but also between the two firms.  We 
compare the free market equilibrium to the outcomes under both the unilateral 
commitment and the collective commitment in terms of prices, quantities and profit.  We 
describe the conditions under which an agreement to limit production of the low 
efficiency model can be profitable.  In Section V we consider in more detail agreements 
that completely eliminate production of the low efficiency model.  For this discussion, we 
extend our basic model to the case where there are three versions of a product (low, 
medium and high efficiency), which allows us to derive a more general result regarding 
product elimination.  A summary and conclusion appears in Section VI. 
  
II. The Basic Model Structure 
To characterize the demand side of the market, we assume that there are N potential 
consumers of the product who vary in their intensity of use, denoted θ, which is 
                                                                                                                                                 
quality.  In our context, imposing such an assumption would make the analysis trivial, since clearly if one 
firm produced only the low efficiency model and the other produced only the high efficiency model, an 
agreement to eliminate production of the low efficiency model would always be costly to the first firm. 
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uniformly distributed on [0, 1].  We can think of θ as, for example, the number of hours 
that the consumer uses the product (or, in the case of washing machines, the number of 
loads of laundry the consumer does in a given period of time), which we assume is 
determined by exogenous factors (e.g., family size).  This assumption is consistent with 
evidence provided by Davis (2004), who showed that household utilization for washing 
machines is very price inelastic.  Each consumer has the option to buy a single unit of the 
product.  We first consider the case where two alternative product models are available, a 
low efficiency model (L) and a high efficiency model (H).   The utility of a consumer of 
type θ who purchases a unit of model i (i = L,H) is given by 
(1)  ( ) ,i E iV U p x P
θ θ θ= − − i
where U(θ) is the associated utility from use of the product,12  pE is the per unit price of 
energy, xi is the energy consumption per unit of use (e.g., per hour) by the type-i model, 
and Pi is the price of the type-i model.  For simplicity we assume that ( )U θ θ= .  Thus, 
the utility of a consumer of type θ who buys the high efficiency model is H HV P
θ λθ= − , 
and that of a consumer who buys the low efficiency model is L LV
θ δθ P= − , where 
1 E Hp xλ = −  and 1 E Lp xδ = − .13  The low efficiency model uses more energy per unit of 
use than the high efficiency model and hence L Hx x>  and δ λ< .14  Note that λ and δ 
                                                 
12 We assume that ( )U θ is independent of the type of model consumed.  This is consistent with the fact 
that improvements in energy consumption does not affect washing machines performance (CECED, 2002). 
 
13 We restrict our analysis to positive values of λ and δ. 
 
14  This is consistent with the ratings of Consumer Reports (2006) where front loading washing machines 
rank higher than top loading machines in terms of energy and water efficiency.  In addition, they rank 
higher in terms of overall performance, which includes not only energy and water efficiency but other 
characteristics as well, such as washing performance, gentleness, noise and cycle time.   We assume that 
these other characteristics are the same across models.  However, our results would still hold if we assume 
that the high efficiency model is superior along these other dimensions as well. 
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reflect the net marginal utility of use of the high and the low efficiency models, 
respectively, which depends on the energy price and the energy efficiency of the models.  
However, typically low efficiency models are less expensive than high efficiency models, 
so we would expect H LP P> , and we will see that in equilibrium this is always true.15  
Thus, when both models are produced and hence available, the prices of the two models 
(along with the other parameters) induce a partitioning of consumers as depicted in the 
upper part of Figure 1.  Under this partitioning, a consumer of type θ will buy the high 
efficiency model if and only if 
(2) H LH
P Pθ θ λ δ
−≥ ≡ − , 
while he will buy the low efficiency model if and only if 
(3) .L L H
P θ θ θδ ≡ ≤ <  
Consumers for whom Lθ θ<  choose not to buy the product at all.16      
Given the distribution of θ, the resulting demands when both models are offered on 
the market are given by 
(4) )1( HH NQ θ−=  
and 
(5) )( LHL NQ θθ −= , 
where is the quantity demanded of model i.  This implies the following inverse 
demand functions: 
iQ
 
(6) (1 )L HP Q LQδ= − −  
                                                 
15 According to Consumer Reports (2006), the top loading washing machines generally sell for $500 or less 
while many of the front loaders sell for $1000 and up. 
  
16 This assumes that utility if the product is not purchased is independent of θ and normalized to zero.   
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and 
 
(7) (1 ) ,H H LP Q Qλ δ= − −  
where we have normalized by setting N=1. Alternatively, when only the high efficiency 
model is produced, the resulting inverse demand is simply given by 
 (8) (1 )H HP Qλ= − . 
 Finally, we assume that production costs are quadratic and that the high efficiency 
model is more costly to produce than the low efficiency model.  This implies 
(9) 
2( ) ,i i i iC q c q=  
where  is the quantity of model i produced by an individual firm and iq H Lc c> .  For 
simplicity, we normalize by setting 0Lc = .  
 
III. The Monopoly Case 
We begin by summarizing the equilibrium when the models are produced by a 
monopolist in order to provide a reference case that illustrates the nature of demand and 
the role of competition between the products within the structure of the model.  By 
comparing this to the duopoly case, we can then see the role of competition between 
firms.   
As noted above, we assume that quality and output (or price in the monopoly case) 
are chosen simultaneously rather than sequentially.  Sequential choice does not give rise 
to symmetric equilibria, which is the case of interest in this analysis (De Fraja, 1996).  
Formally, this can be captured by assuming the monopolist simultaneously chooses
M
HQ
 how 
much of each product (each quality) to produce, i.e., it simultaneously chooses MHQ and 
M
LQ  to    
 10
(10)  2maximize ( )M M M M M MH H L L H HP Q P Q c QΠ = + − , 
 
where the superscript M denotes the monopoly and the demand functions are given by (6) 
and (7).  We can represent a commitment by the monopolist to restrict or eliminate 
production of the low efficiency model by a constraint MLQ K≤ , where K is the upper 
limit on the output of the low efficiency model. 17   When the monopolist makes a 
commitment to restrict or eliminate production of the inefficient model, it maximizes 
profit given in (10) subject to this constraint.  We denote the maximized profit by 
.  Note that a sufficiently high value of K, set above the unconstrained output 
level, is a non-binding commitment corresponding to the free market scenario, while a 
value of K equal to zero represents a commitment to completely eliminate the low 
efficiency model from the market. Within the range where K is binding, we can easily 
show the following:
( )M Kπ
18  
 
Proposition 1: A (binding) commitment by a monopolist to restrict production of the low 
efficiency model will result in:    
(i) an increase in the production of the high efficiency model (i.e., 0<∂
∂
K
Q MH );  
(ii) increases in the prices of both models (i.e., 0<∂
∂
K
P ML  and 0<∂
∂
K
P MH ); and 
(iii) a reduction in the monopolist’s profits (i.e., 0
M
K
π∂ >∂ ). 
                                                 
17 Although the washing machines agreement had two components, we only model the first.  The second 
target, reducing the average energy consumption by 20%, was non-binding given the first.  The second 
target was met before the end of the agreement date (CECED, 2000). 
 
18 Proofs of all propositions are provided in an appendix that is available upon request. 
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 Proposition 1 implies that, when the monopolist commits to limit production of the 
inefficient model, it simultaneously raises the price and the quantity of the efficient 
model.  The reduction in the quantity of the inefficient model is accompanied by an 
increase in its price, which causes some of the consumers who previously bought the low 
efficiency model to switch to the high efficiency model and some to stop buying the 
product altogether.  The reduction in production of the inefficient product effectively 
reduces competition between the two models, allowing the simultaneous increase in both 
price and quantity of the other model.  However, the new price-quantity combinations 
cannot yield higher profit, since if they did, they would have been the optimal choices in 
the absence of the production constraint.  Thus, when the market is supplied by a 
monopolist, the voluntary commitment can never be profitable, implying that some other 
inducement (e.g., a regulatory threat) is necessary in order to reduce or eliminate 
production of the polluting model.  We show below that this result does not necessarily 
hold in the context of a duopoly, implying that the competition between firms plays a key 
role in determining the effect of a voluntary agreement on profits. 
 
IV.  The Duopoly Case 
IV.1.  The Pre-Commitment Equilibrium 
We turn next to the primary case of interest where the market is supplied by two 
firms.  We assume that the two firms have identical costs and are Cournot competitors.   
Thus, given the inverse market demands in (6) and (7), each firm seeks to maximize its 
profits by choosing the quantities of the two models to produce, given the quantities of 
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the other firm. Thus, absent any commitments to reduce production of the polluting 
product, firm j simply chooses jHq  and 
j
Lq so as to    
(11)    2maximize ( )j j j jH H L L H HP q P q c qΠ = + − . 
It is straightforward to show that the resulting Nash equilibrium has the following 
properties (where the superscript “ ” denotes the initial equilibrium prior to any 
commitments):    
0
 
Proposition 2:  (i) 0 0H LP P> , (ii) 10 20L Lq q=  and 10 20H Hq q= , and (iii) 0 0iLq =  if and only if . 0Hc =
 
As expected, in equilibrium the price of the high efficiency model is higher than that of 
the low efficiency model.  Because the low efficiency model uses more energy and hence 
has higher operating costs, in equilibrium it must have a lower purchase price in order to 
induce any consumers to buy it.  In addition, the firms produce the same amount of each 
of the models, i.e. there is no quality specialization. In addition, without a commitment to 
do otherwise, both firms will choose to produce both models unless the high efficiency 
model is costless to produce.  This is consistent with the observation that firms often 
produce very similar product lines that include both environmentally friendly and less 
friendly models, rather than specializing in the production of one or the other as predicted 
by much of the quality choice literature (see Chen, 2001).       
 Given a characterization of the initial equilibrium, we turn to the three questions 
of interest:  (a) Does either firm have an incentive to commit unilaterally to reduce or 
eliminate production of the low efficiency/polluting product?  (b) Do the firms have an 
incentive to commit collectively (i.e., bilaterally) to such a restriction?  and (c) if the 
firms enter a collective agreement, does each firm have an incentive to adhere to the 
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agreement, i.e., are collective agreements of this type self-enforcing?  We consider each 
of these questions in turn. 
 
IV.2.  A Unilateral Commitment 
We analyze this possibility by considering a case where one firm, say firm 1, 
unilaterally commits to limit its production of the low efficiency model.   Thus, 1ULq K≤ , 
where 10LK q≤  and the superscript U denotes the case of a unilateral commitment.   As 
before, the firms choose quantities to maximize the profit in (11), given this restriction.  
We examine the effect of this limitation by characterizing how the equilibrium responds 
as the commitment level becomes increasingly more stringent (starting from the non-
binding level where 10LK q= ).  This response is summarized in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: A unilateral commitment by firm 1 to reduce its production of the low 
efficiency model results in:  
(i) a shift in production by firm 1 away from the low efficiency model toward the 
high efficiency model (i.e., 
1
0
U
Hq
K
∂ <∂ );  
(ii)  a shift in production by firm 2 away from the high efficiency model toward the 
low efficiency model (i.e., 
2
0
U
Hq
K
∂ >∂  and  
2
0
U
Lq
K
∂ <∂ ); 
(iii) an overall decrease in the production of the low efficiency model and an overall 
increase in the production of the high efficiency model (i.e., 0
U
LQ
K
∂ >∂  and 
0
U
HQ
K
∂ <∂ ); and  
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(iv)  increases in the prices of both models (i.e., 0
U
LP
K
∂ <∂  and 0
U
HP
K
∂ <∂ ). 
 
Proposition 3 implies that some of the reduction in output of the polluting product by 
firm 1 is offset by an increase in the output of this product by firm 2.  Despite this 
“leakage” effect, overall output of the polluting product still declines.  Thus, firm 1’s 
commitment is effective in reducing energy consumption and hence improving 
environmental quality,19 although clearly it is not as effective as it would be without the 
leakage.  In addition, rather than sharing both markets equally as before, firm 1 now 
supplies a larger share of the high efficiency market while firm 2 supplies a larger share 
of the low efficiency market.  Thus, the commitment does create some (albeit not 
complete) differentiation and specialization.  Finally, as in the monopoly case, firm 1’s 
commitment leads to an increase in the prices of both models, which ceteris paribus is 
beneficial not only to the firm making the commitment but to its competitor as well.  The 
question is then whether the combined effects of these changes increase or decrease 
profits.  The impacts on profitability are given in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4:  0 01 1 2 2( ) ( )
U UK Kπ π π π< = < for all binding K.  
 
Here ( )Ui Kπ represents firm i’s maximum profit when firm 1 commits to a reduction of 
stringency K.  Proposition 4 implies that a unilateral commitment by one firm to reduce 
production of the polluting product, thereby specializing (incompletely) in production of 
                                                 
19 Note that total energy use depends not only on the number of units of each type sold, but also on the use 
characteristics of the consumers who buy these units..  However, since 0UL Lθ θ> and 0UH Hθ θ< , the 
unilateral commitment leads to an unambiguous reduction in energy use. 
 
 15
the less polluting product, would be costly to that firm and beneficial to its competitor.  
This implies that within the context of our model no firm has an incentive to unilaterally 
reduce (or eliminate) production of a polluting product.  We turn next to the question of 
whether this result continues to hold if the commitment is collective or bilateral rather 
than unilateral. 
 
IV.3.  A Collective (Bilateral) Agreement 
 As noted above, we capture the effect of a collective or bilateral agreement to 
reduce or eliminate production of the low efficiency model by imposing a constraint 
KqiBL ≤  on each firm’s production decisions, 20  where throughout the superscript B 
denotes a variable in the case where the agreement is bilateral.  Although we assume the 
firms collectively decide to limit the production of the low efficiency model, we continue 
to model their output choices for the high efficiency model as a Nash equilibrium, since 
any cooperation on the choice of output levels for this model would likely be in violation 
of anti-trust laws.  Thus, each firm chooses its production levels for both models to 
maximize the profit given in (11), given this restriction.  We model the firms entering the 
bilateral agreement as a reduction of K below the production level of each firm in the 
initial equilibrium.  Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the agreement on the partitioning of 
consumers by purchase decision.  The impacts on prices and quantities are summarized in 
Proposition 5. 
 
                                                 
20 This constraint is binding over the range [0, ], where is the pre-agreement level of output of the 
low efficiency model of firm j.  We limit consideration of K to this range. 
0j
Lq
0j
Lq
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Proposition 5: A collective agreement to limit production of the low efficiency model 
results in: 
(i) an increase in production of the high efficiency model by each firm and hence 
in total ( i.e., 0<∂
∂
K
qiBH  for i=1,2 and hence 0<∂
∂
K
Q BH ), and  
(ii) increases in the prices of both models ( i.e., 0<∂
∂
K
PBH  and 0<∂
∂
K
PBL ). 
  
Proposition 5 implies that the impact of the agreement on prices and quantities is 
qualitatively similar in the monopoly and duopoly cases.  When the output of the low 
efficiency model is reduced, its price increases.  This increases the demand for the high 
efficiency model as some of the consumers who used to buy the low efficiency model 
now buy the high efficiency model instead.  This increased demand results in an increase 
in the price of the high efficiency model as well.   In addition, some consumers who were 
buying the low efficiency model before now choose not to buy at all.    
  Although the impact of the agreement on prices and quantities is qualitatively 
similar under monopoly and duopoly, the same is not true for the impact on producer 
profits.  In the monopoly case, the firm’s commitment to reduce production of the low 
efficiency model always reduces profit.  Similarly, a unilateral commitment by one firm 
reduced the profits of that firm.  However, we show here that in the case of a duopoly a 
commitment to limit production that is bilateral rather than unilateral can, at least over 
some range, increase profits for both firms.   
We consider the impact of a collective agreement on profits by examining ( )Bi Kπ , 
the individual firm’s maximum profit as a function of K.  In particular, we ask how profit 
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varies with reductions in K and how the value of profit at K=0 compares to its 
unrestricted level.  The relationship between profit and K is summarized in Proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6:  ( )Bi Kπ  is non-monotonic and reaches a maximum at a value of K, *K , 
that lies in the range 0(0, )Lq . 
 
The relationship between profits and K implied by Proposition 6 is depicted in 
Figure 2.  It shows that up to a given level, a collective commitment to limit production 
of the low efficiency model will actually increase firm profit relative to the pre-
agreement scenario, although beyond a certain point further restriction will decrease 
profit.  
The intuition for the non monotonic relationship between π and K is the 
following.  Starting from the pre-agreement production levels, a binding agreement to 
limit production of the low efficiency model effectively allows firms to collude in the 
market for the low efficiency model and thus suppresses competition between firms in 
this market.21  This increases profits for both firms.  Note that this effect does not exist 
when output is produced by a monopolist.  However, as output of the inefficient product 
is further restricted, the gains from reduced competition are outweighed by the direct 
effect of the output restriction, which causes a reduction in profit as in the monopoly 
case.  In this range of K, even though the prices of both models as well as the sales of the 
high efficiency model increase, the gains from this are more than offset by losses 
resulting from reduced sales in the other market.  Thus, as Proposition 6 states, further 
reductions in output of the low efficiency model below will cause profits to decline.  *K
                                                 
21 Note that, if firms could effectively collude in both markets rather than just the market for the low 
efficiency model, the range over which the restriction would be profitable would be reduced.  
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More formally, we can decompose the effect of changing K on firm profit as follows.  
Firm i’s profit is given by the Lagrangian function 
(12)     2( ) (iB iB iB iBi H H L L H H LP q P q c q K qεΦ = + − + − )
where ε  is the Lagrangian multiplier.  The impact of a reduction in K on firm profit is 
given by 
(13)   ?
, ,iH iL iH iL
B
iB iBi i H L
H L
restriction q q q q
effect
strategic effect
d dP dPq q
K dK dK dK
π ε∂ Φ= = + +∂ ???????????
 
 
where 
,iH iL
jB j
s s s
B
H L
q q H L
dP P Pdq dq
dK Q dK Q dK
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂   for s=H, L.  
This decomposition shows that the agreement has two effects on firm profit: a restriction 
effect and a strategic effect.22  The restriction effect is always positive, indicating that 
absent any strategic behavior, the agreement always reduces firm profit as in the 
monopoly case.  The strategic effect represents the gain in profit due to the rise in all 
prices as the other firm’s choices are restricted by the agreement.  Given Proposition 5(i) 
and the downward sloping demand, the strategic effect is always negative.23  The net 
effect will depend on the value of K. 
The range over which a bilateral agreement is profitable varies with the energy 
efficiency of the two models as well as the relative cost of production.  For example, the 
more inefficient the low efficiency model is, the greater is the range over which an 
                                                 
22 This is an application of the general principle that, in the presence of strategic behavior, the shadow price 
of a constraint is not the Lagrange multiplier (see Caputo 2006).     
23 The strategic effect is always negative since
1 1,
2( )
H L
L H
q q
dP c
dK
δ β 0= − < and 
1 1,
3( ) 2( )
H L
L H
q q
dP c
dK
λ δδ β
− += − < 0 . 
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agreement would be profitable, i.e.
*
0
L
K
x
∂ <∂ .    An increase in the efficiency of the more 
efficient model has a similar effect, i.e. 
*
0
H
K
x
∂ >∂ .  Intuitively, the more dissimilar the 
two models are, the greater is the potential to increase profit by reducing output in the 
low efficiency market and shifting some of this demand to the high efficiency market.  
Likewise, given Lx and Hx , an increase in the price of energy will increase the 
importance of the difference in efficiency and hence increase the range over which an 
agreement is profitable.  This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a VA is more likely to 
emerge when or in countries where energy prices are high, a result that may explain the 
greater prevalence of these types of agreements in Europe than in the U.S. 
  The non-monotonicity of profit in K has an immediate implication given in 
Corollary 1. 
 
Corollary 1:  A profitable bilateral agreement always exists. 
 
This implies that, although not all agreements are profitable, it is always possible to find 
output restrictions that would be profitable.  In particular, any agreement with a value of 
K that is binding but greater than *K  will be profitable even though in the absence of the 
agreement both firms would choose not to limit production of the low efficiency model 
on their own and hence the agreement constitutes a binding restriction on their choices. 
The above results suggest that, at least over some range, firms have an incentive 
to enter into collective agreements that reduce the production of polluting products.  This 
implies that government inducements may not be necessary to elicit collective 
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agreements of this type (although, as discussed below, the implicit enforcement provided 
by the public nature of the commitment is necessary to ensure its success).  Since a 
collective agreement would reduce energy use, the above results suggest the possibility of 
outcomes where the agreement both increases producer profits and improves 
environmental quality.  Of course, whether this leads to an increase in social welfare will 
depend on whether these gains exceed the losses to consumers that result from the output 
restrictions and associated price increases.24
 Given that at least some collective agreements can be profitable for firms, we turn 
next to the question of whether firms who enter into collective agreements have an 
incentive to adhere to those agreements, i.e., whether such agreements are self-enforcing.    
 
IV.4.  The Role of Enforcement 
We can examine the incentive for each firm to adhere to a collective agreement by 
reinterpreting the unilateral commitment scenario as a “cheating” scenario, i.e., a scenario 
under which there is a bilateral agreement and firm 1 chooses to adhere to the 
commitment while firm 2 chooses not to adhere.  With this interpretation, the results in 
Proposition 3 can be used to show the incentive to cheat.  Proposition 3 implies that,     
as firm 1 commits to lowering its production of the low efficiency model, firm 2’s best 
response is to expand its production.  In other words, 2Lq K=  is not an optimal response 
to , implying that is not a Nash equilibrium.  Thus, if one firm 1Lq K= 1 2L Lq q K= =
                                                 
24 It can be shown that restrictions on production of the low efficiency model unambiguously reduce 
consumer surplus, and that this loss in consumer surplus exceeds the associated increase in producer 
profits.  Thus, a collective agreement will always lead to a reduction in market surplus.  The impact on 
social welfare will then depend on whether this loss is more than offset by the reduction in the external 
environmental damages generated by the associated reduction in energy use. 
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believes the other will adhere to the agreement, it has an incentive to “cheat” and expand 
production of the low efficiency product.   
The incentive to cheat can also be seen directly from a comparison of profits 
under unilateral and bilateral commitments.  Despite the gain in market share in the high 
efficiency market that firm 1 realizes when firm 2 cheats, as Proposition 7 states, overall 
firm 2 can increase its profit by cheating at the expense of firm 1.   
 
Proposition 7:  (i) 2 2( ) ( )
U BK Kπ π>  and (ii) 1 1( ) ( )U BK Kπ π<  for all binding K. 
 
Proposition 7 implies that the incentive to cheat exists even when the collective 
agreement increases the profits of both firms (relative to their initial levels).  This 
suggests that over the range where such an agreement is profitable, the firms face a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma under which the firms can both increase profits through collectively 
reducing production of the low efficiency model but neither would have an incentive to 
adhere to such an agreement.   Thus, even when it is profitable, the collective agreement 
is not self-enforcing.  In order for it to be sustained, some means to enforce the 
commitment is needed.   This could explain the emergence of a public voluntary 
agreement under which firms publicly declare their commitments to reduce production of 
polluting products.  The public nature of the agreement can provide an enforcement 
mechanism.  In this context the cost of monitoring is low and hence cheating on the 
agreement would presumably be easily detected.  As long as there is a sufficiently large 
cost associated with cheating, for example through damage to the firm’s public image, 
cheating will be deterred.   
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V.   Complete Elimination of the Polluting Product 
 In the analysis of the effect of the collective agreement on firm level profits, we 
showed that there exists a range of K over which an agreement to reduce the output of the 
low efficiency model is profitable for both firms but did not examine in details whether 
an agreement to eliminate its production completely (as in the European washing 
machine agreement) would be profitable.  The graph in Figure 2 suggests that it would 
not, i.e., that .   However, unlike our other results, this result is not 
general and depends on the assumption that there are only two models that can be 
produced (low and high).  In this section, we briefly show that when there are three 
possible models (low, medium, and high), it is possible that even a complete elimination 
of the low efficiency model from the market can increases profits for both firms, although 
such a result is not guaranteed (i.e., a decrease in profit is possible as well).   
0 0 0(0) ( )Bi i i qπ π π< = L
 The structure of the model is the same as above except that we assume there are 
three possible versions of the product: the high, the medium and the low efficiency 
model. The inverse demand functions become: 
(14)    (1 ) ( ) ( )H H MP Q Q LQλ γ δ= − − −  
(15)    (1 ) ( )M H M LP Q Q Qμ δ= − − −  
(16)    (1 )L H MP Q Q LQδ= − − −  
where the subscript M refers to the medium model, 1 E MP xμ = − , and all other variables 
are as defined previously.  Note that the three product model reduces to the two product 
model considered above if δ=0. 
All of the propositions from Sections IV for the two model case carry over to the case 
when there are three models.  However, unlike the case with the two product model, the 
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agreement to eliminate the low efficiency model from the market completely can now be 
profitable.  Proposition 8 states the conditions under which this is true. 
 
Proposition 8:  If  9 ( ) 4 H Mc cμ λ μ− >  and δ is sufficiently small, then 0(0)Bi iπ π> for 
i=1,2. 
 
To understand the role of the number of models, note that the monopoly profit is 
always higher under three models than under the two model case.  Johnson and Myatt 
(2003) show that when there are increasing returns to quality provision, the monopolist 
offers only the highest possible quality.  This is consistent with our finding since if 
, the monopolist offers only the high efficiency model.  A monopolist 
offers the full range of product qualities when there are decreasing returns to quality 
provision (Johnson and Myatt, 2003).  Although introducing the third model intensifies 
competition between models which drives prices of the existing models down, it enables 
the monopolist to cover a larger proportion of the market and raise profit.   
0H M Lc c c= = =
However, determining the optimal number of models in a duopoly setting is different 
due to the competition effect.  While the cost structure determines the optimal number of 
models in a monopoly market, in the duopoly case the relative preferences over the 
models plays a role as well.  If the value of δ is sufficiently low, i.e., the marginal utility 
of use and therefore price of the low efficiency model is low , then collectively 
eliminating the low efficiency model from the market is profitable as the losses from 
sales of that model are offset by the gains from reduced competition between firms 
(which significantly raises prices).  In other words, as the agreement eliminates 
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competition in the relatively weak markets, firms’ profit will be higher.25 However in 
equilibrium firms would supply all models since the outcome with the optimal number of 
models is not Nash equilibrium. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
In many contexts, pollution stems from consumption or use of a product rather than 
its production.  The most notable example is energy consumption by appliances or other 
consumer products.  In these contexts, environmental quality improvements can be 
achieved by promoting the use of more energy efficient products.  Recently, some 
industries have collectively agreed not to produce models that do not meet an energy 
efficiency (and hence an environmental) standard and to also set a minimum average 
energy efficiency standard, which can be achieved by limiting production of the low 
efficiency models.   
In this paper, we have presented a simple model that can be used to examine a 
voluntary collective agreement to limit or completely eliminate the production of the low 
efficiency model of a given product (e.g., a low efficiency washing machine).  The model 
incorporates the potential for competition both between firms and between product 
models (high vs. low efficiency).   
Starting from a pre-agreement equilibrium in which each firm supplies an identical 
product line in response to consumer heterogeneity, we show that, when there is 
competition between firms, a collective agreement to limit or even eliminate production 
of the polluting model can actually increase profits for all firms in the industry, an 
outcome that is not possible without that competition (i.e., in a monopoly model).  This 
                                                 
25 The fact that this result does not hold under the two product model suggests that the gains from reducing 
competition and having only one product in the market are outweighed by the reduced market coverage.   
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suggests that a collective agreement of this type might actually be beneficial to firms, 
while at the same time improving environmental quality.  However, the implicit 
enforcement that comes from the public nature of the commitment is necessary to ensure 
this outcome.  Absent this enforcement, each firm would have an incentive to cheat on 
the agreement.   
Taken together, our results suggest that in general a collective agreement can be 
beneficial in terms of both producer profits and environmental quality relative to both the 
pre-agreement outcome and the outcome if a firm commits unilaterally.  This suggests 
that, by promoting such agreements, policymakers may be able to achieve substantial 
environmental gains with relatively little inducement.  The impact on social welfare will 
then depend on whether these gains are sufficiently large to offset consumer losses from 
reductions in product variety and the associated price increases. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions (for Reviewers) 
Proposition 1: Solving the profit maximization of the monopolist, the equilibrium 
quantities and prices are: 
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 Taking the partials with respect to K we get (1 ) 0
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The profit is given by 
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λ
− − −∂ =∂ + , which is positive over the binding range 
of K. 
Proposition 2: The equilibrium quantities under the pre-agreement scenario are: 
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The corresponding equilibrium prices are given by: 
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Comparing (A.8) and (A.9) shows that (i) holds, (ii) is true because of symmetry and (iii) 
holds if we substitute in (A.6). 0Hc =
Proposition 3: The resulting Nash equilibrium quantities under the unilateral 
commitment are given by: 
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where 3 2 Hcβ λ= + , 2 Hcγ λ≡ + and 3 5 Hcρ λ≡ + .  And sinceλ δ> , then 0γβ δρ− > . 
The corresponding equilibrium prices are: 
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From equation (A.10) we get
1 3 ( ) 0
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∂ − + Hc=−∂ − < .  From equation (A.11) we get 
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∂ −=∂ − > .  From equation (A.13) we get 
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Adding 1UHq  and 
2U
Hq  and differentiating with respect to K we get 
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U
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∂ −= −∂ − + , which is negative.  The total output of the low 
efficiency model is .  Differentiating with respect to K we get 2 ( )
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From equation (A.14) we get 
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Proposition 4: Under the pre-commitment scenario 10 20( ,L Lq q ) is a Nash equilibrium.  
1U
Lq is not the optimal response to 
20
Lq  and thus 01 ( )U K 1π π< .  We can also show that 
2 ( )
U Kπ is decreasing in K and thus 02 2 ( )U Kπ π< .  Also, since both prices rise with the 
unilateral commitment, as is clear from (A.13) and (A.14) where prices are inversely 
related to K, then the previous result holds as well. 
Proposition 5: The resulting Nash equilibrium quantities under the commitment where  
are given by: jLq K≤
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The corresponding equilibrium prices are: 
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Proposition 6:  The change in profit of firm i for a change in K is given by: 
(A.19) 
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which will depend on the value of the parameters and the level of commitment K.26  The 
profit of firm i, ( )Bi Kπ  reaches a maximum at *K where 
                                                 
26The impact on profit also depends on the underlying distribution of consumers according to θ.  In the 
model we assumed a uniform distribution for simplicity and to ensure a closed form solution.  We can 
derive the results for a general distribution of consumers ( )F θ  as follows:  
 )(1 HH FQ θ−=  
( ) ( )L HQ F F Lθ θ= −  
(1 )L HP H Q QLδ= − −  
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where 1−≡ FH .  The effect that a change in K has on firm profit is given by: 
2
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 The above expression will determine the effect of tightening (relaxing) the constraint on firm 
profit, for a given distribution of consumers.  While the agreement reduces firm profit for the monopolist, 
the impact of the agreement on firm profit for the duopoly is ambiguous.   The result will depend, among 
other factors, on the distribution of consumers ( )F θ . 
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and *0 i0LK q< < .  Therefore * 0( )Bi iKπ π> . 
Proposition 7:  Under the unilateral commitment scenario 1ULq K= and , and 
therefore (i) holds.  The total market output of both models is higher under the unilateral 
commitment while the prices are lower.  Since, for a given level of K, prices are lower 
under the pre commitment scenario, then (ii) follows.   
2U
Lq ≠ K
iProposition 8: We define the difference in profit,
0( ) (0)BiDiff δ π π= − , to be the extra 
profit realized by an individual firm as a result of the agreement to eliminate the low 
efficiency model as a function of 0δ =δ 'δ δ=.  Then ( ) 0Diff δ = when or where 
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− − + + + −= − − + − − − + + .  If 
'[0, ]δ δ∈9 ( ) 4 H Mc cμ λ μ− > , then  and ' 0δ > ( ) 0Diff δ > for .   
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